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Regulation of the use of cellular phones by individuals while driving is now
commonplace outside the United States and has been proposed in a number of jurisdictions in the
United States. There is growing concern that using cellular phones while driving leads to
increases in accidents and fatalities. This paper provides an economic analysis of regulatory
options for addressing cellular phone usage by drivers of vehicles. While large uncertainties
surrounding both benefits and costs exist, a key conclusion is that banning drivers from using
cellular phones is a bad idea. Our best estimate is that the costs of a ban are likely to exceed
benefits by more than $20 billion annually. Less intrusive regulation, such as requiring the use of
a hands-free device that would allow a driver to use both hands for steering also is not likely to
be economically justified.
We are doubtful that the net benefits from a ban on drivers’ using hand-held phones or a
mandate requiring the use of hands-free devices would be positive for three reasons. First, the
results of our quantitative benefit-cost analysis suggest that costs are likely to exceed benefits.
Second, our best estimates of accidents and fatality reductions do not take into account how
drivers would alter their behavior in response to regulation. If regulations were enforced, drivers
may simply switch to other risky behaviors. Thus, the net reductions in accidents and fatalities
are likely to be overstated, which means the benefits of regulatory interventions could be quite
small. Third, the technology is already moving in the direction of voice activation, which is
likely to reduce risks.
Instead of regulating now, the federal government and the states should collect more
systematic information on the relationship between cellular phone use by individuals while
driving and accidents. Specifically, governments should attempt to improve estimates of the
number of accidents and fatalities associated with cellular phone use. It is possible that accidents
are underestimated now. Moreover, an argument can be made that accidents will increase more
than linearly as more drivers use cellular phones in vehicles. The federal government should also
assess the benefits and costs of introducing promising new technologies that could reduce the
risks of accidents associated with drivers’ using cellular phones in vehicles.1
The Economics of Regulating Cellular Phones in Vehicles
Robert W. Hahn and Paul C. Tetlock
1. Introduction
Cellular phone subscribership in the United States has grown dramatically in recent
years, from 92,000 people in 1985 to over 77,000,000 today.
1 It is now common to see people
using cellular phones on the street, in a vehicle, or on a golf course. Cellular phones provide
important conveniences, including the ability to check on children, get help in an emergency, and
coordinate schedules. In addition, drivers sometimes use cellular phones to report accidents and
alert police and fire fighters to problems that need to be addressed.
2
Unfortunately, cellular phones can also impose costs on society. One of the potentially
significant costs of cellular phone usage while driving is its effect on vehicle accidents, injuries
and deaths. We estimate that about 100 people die each year in the United States as a
consequence of collisions related to cellular phone use.
3 While small in comparison with the
41,000 people who die in vehicle accidents each year, there is concern that the number could
grow with increasing cellular phone usage.
4
Recognizing potential problems with cellular phone usage by drivers of motor vehicles,
municipalities, states, and countries have responded with a large array of regulatory proposals.
Although only one American municipality has implemented a ban on individuals’ using cellular
phones while driving, several foreign countries have enacted laws, including limited and total
bans. The purpose of this regulatory analysis is to provide an economic evaluation of regulatory
options for addressing cellular phone usage by drivers and to suggest an approach to regulation.
Our primary conclusion is that banning cellular phone usage by drivers is a bad idea. A ban in
the United States is estimated to result in annual economic welfare losses of about $23 billion.
5
                                               
1 Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) (1999).
2 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (1997).
3 This is a rough estimate. See discussion in Section 4 and the appendix for details. Our calculations are based on
state and national accident data adjusted to 1999. See NHTSA (1997, 1998, 1999), Oklahoma Highway Safety
Office (1997), and Minnesota Office of Traffic Safety (1996). An upper-bound estimate, which is based on an
epidemiological study by Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997), suggests that deaths could be on the order of 1,000
annually.
4 See NHTSA (1999) projections.
5 All numbers are adjusted to July 1999 dollars using the consumer price index. See Council of Economic Advisers
(1999). Calculations are generally rounded to two significant digits.2
Less intrusive regulation, such as requiring the use of a hands-free device that would allow a
driver to use both hands for steering also is not likely to be economically justified. If regulation
is necessary at all, we argue that it should focus on gathering additional information to determine
the extent of the problem.
Section 2 of the paper reviews the economic rationale for such regulation and provides an
overview of current regulatory proposals in the United States and abroad. Section 3 provides a
critical analysis of studies that link cellular phone usage while driving to increased injuries and
fatalities. Section 4 identifies some policy options and presents a benefit-cost analysis of those
options. Section 5 offers some conclusions and recommendations.
2. Cellular Phone Regulation in Vehicles
Economic Rationale
The economic rationale for regulation is frequently defined in terms of addressing a
“market failure.” Market failures can arise when consumers fail to pay for the full costs of risks
that they impose on others. Thus, for example, if a driver were uninsured and not held liable for
damages to others, he might take unnecessary risks.
6 Similarly, if insurance companies
underestimated the risks of engaging in particular activities, such as using cellular phones while
driving, some drivers would engage in excessive risk-taking activity. Note in this latter case,
however, that insurance companies would have an incentive to improve on their assessment in
order not to have to pay excessive damage claims.
Winston and Shirley argue that travelers bear most of the costs of vehicle accidents
through different kinds of insurance.
7 If it is true that travelers, and hence, drivers, pay most of
the costs of vehicle accidents, then there may not be a significant market failure that needs to be
addressed with the advent of cellular phone use in vehicles. Indeed, unless insurance markets are
not working particularly well, the presumption should be that the market failure is likely to be
small.
8 If the market failure associated with drivers’ using cellular phones is small, then it is
likely that government intervention would actually reduce efficiency. This is true because
                                               
6 As discussed below, drivers can take different levels of care.  For example, a voice-activated, hands-free cellular
phone is likely to impose lower risks than a more conventional cellular phone.
7 See Winston and Shirley (1998). The authors note that one exception relates to congestion costs caused by
accidents.
8 There are well-known inefficiencies in insurance markets related to rate regulation. See, for example, Harrington
(forthcoming). For our purposes, the key issue is whether current insurance payments by drivers cover most of the
costs of accidents, and it appears that they do.3
government policy interventions rarely focus on improving economic efficiency as their primary
goal.
While there is not a strong case for the existence of a significant market failure, there is at
least a theoretical possibility of such a failure: cellular phone use in vehicles could impose large
social costs without commensurate benefits; or, alternatively, some small modifications in
cellular phone use in vehicles could result in significant reductions in accidents without imposing
significant costs. Thus, it would be useful to know how different regulatory approaches are likely
to affect economic welfare. This is especially true given the increased interest in regulation. This
is especially true given the increased interest in state and local legislation regulating cellular
phones in vehicles.
Existing and Proposed Regulations
On March 22, 1999, Brooklyn, Ohio became the first city in the United States to ban
cellular phone usage in vehicles. Brooklyn’s ordinance bans the usage of cellular phones while
driving unless drivers keep both hands on the steering wheel. The law exempts speakerphones,
emergency calls and calls placed from parked vehicles. Offenses are punishable by a $100 fine,
but so far highway patrol officers have only issued warnings to drivers. Because Brooklyn was
also the first city to mandate the use of seatbelts, media speculation surrounding the Brooklyn
ordinance has focused on its potential national repercussions.
9 Following Brooklyn’s lead, other
cities and states may implement similar laws. For example, New York City banned taxi drivers
from using cellular phones on July 1, 1999.
10
Table 1 summarizes state legislation and proposed legislation for regulating cellular
phones in vehicles. States did not begin to address cellular phone concerns until 1987 and most
state legislative proposals have been introduced in the last two years.
11 The table shows there is a
great deal of variation across states both in terms of laws and proposed legislation.
States have either enacted no measures or very modest measures aimed at regulating
cellular phones. Massachusetts has the most stringent law of all the states, requiring drivers
talking on their cellular phones to keep at least one hand on the wheel. California’s law orders
rental car dealers to provide customers with instructions for the safe use of a cellular phone in all
                                               
9 CNN Interactive (1999).
10 Jacobs (1999).
11 This information was found with the help of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and
Automobile Association of America (AAA) using a State Net search through Lexis.4
rental cars with installed phones. Florida prohibits the use of certain headset devices in
conjunction with a cellular phone because such devices impair a driver’s ability to hear
surrounding sounds of the road.
At least four states are experimenting with methods for gathering additional information
to assess the extent to which cellular phone use affects vehicle safety. Measures enacted in
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma emphasize data collection. These states direct
their motor vehicle departments to include information in their annual reports on cellular phones
as a potential contributing factor in traffic accidents. They have also made changes to police
accident reports to allow officers to easily record driver use of a cellular phone at the time of an
accident.
All states have laws designed to prevent inattentive driving. These laws aim to curtail a
driver’s irresponsible habits, including negligent cellular phone use. However, they are often
vague, open to legal interpretation and poorly enforced.
12 Concerns about cellular phone use
while driving may lead many states to adopt stricter inattentive driving laws, but only the five
listed in table 1, Delaware, Idaho, New Mexico, Ohio and Wisconsin, have recently specified
unacceptable practices. It is unclear whether additional efforts to strengthen these laws will affect
driving habits.
Legislative proposals in the states vary substantially in their scope. Some would ban all
non-emergency use of cellular phones, whereas others provide several types of exemptions. For
example, drivers may be allowed a grace period for incoming calls, to call from emergency
vehicles, to use cellular phones in rural areas, to use cellular phones while parked, and to report
emergencies. Over ten states have considered laws banning cellular phones in virtually all types
of vehicles. These laws would apply to the vast majority of users in non-emergency situations.
At the other extreme, Virginia legislators proposed a bill that would ban only the use of cellular
phones by school bus operators—probably less than 0.1% of users. Instead of excluding certain
classes of drivers from bans, most legislation would exempt certain classes of cellular phones.
For example, hands-free and speaker phones in vehicles would not be subject to a ban under the
                                               
12 NHTSA (1997).5
measures proposed in over ten states including California, New York, and Virginia.
13 Hands-free
phones comprise about 14% of the cellular phone market in the United States.
14
A few states are discussing methods for learning more about the safety hazards of cellular
phone use in vehicles. Louisiana, Oregon and Ohio have proposed collecting data to determine
the number of accidents related to driver cellular phone use. Following the lead of Oklahoma and
Minnesota, these states would include more information in their accident reports.
New York has considered launching informational campaigns against unsafe cellular
phone use while driving. One measure would require manufacturers of cellular phones to place
warning labels on their boxes stating: “The use of a cellular telephone or car phone while
operating a motor vehicle has been known to be the cause of traffic accidents and caution is
advised in such use.”
15 It is difficult to gauge the influence such warnings would have on driver
behavior, but we are skeptical they would have much impact.
 Table 2 shows that several foreign countries are already regulating cellular phone use in
vehicles. Foreign legislation varies in terms of timing and scope. The Australian state of New
South Wales implemented a measure banning the use of hand-held phones in vehicles back in
1935, whereas Switzerland banned such use only three years ago. In Victoria, Australia all
cellular phone use in vehicles is illegal, while Chile, England, Israel, Italy, and Spain ban the use
of hand-held phones.
This summary of key legislation reveals that partial cellular phone bans in vehicles are a
reality in several foreign countries, but that most jurisdictions have shied away from complete
bans. The absence of total bans can be explained in part by the expected resistance from drivers
that currently use cellular phones in vehicles. In addition, the cellular industry is likely to oppose
such bans vigorously.
16
While widespread adoption of total bans seems unlikely, this review suggests that there is
increasing interest in considering some kind of regulation of cellular phones in vehicles. The
                                               
13 The principal difference between hands-free and hand-held cellular phones is that the hand-held cellular phones
must be held in the hand. Installed car phones with a cord are categorized as hand-held. Cellular phones with a
headset attachment or mobile phones with a speaker function are defined as hands-free.
14 NHTSA (1997).
15 This information was found with the help of NCSL and AAA using a State Net search through Lexis.
16 Currently the industry tends to support enforcement of inattentive driving laws and is opposed to bans.  If
confronted with a ban, however, it is possible the industry would support hands-free devices or voice activation as
an alternative for several reasons: first, a ban is likely to be quite costly to the industry; second, some in the industry
could benefit from the sale of new products and services; and third, supporting such alternatives would show that the
industry is concerned with safety.6
increasing interest in legislation can be explained, in part, by the explosive growth rate of the
cellular industry and the anecdotal evidence of risks posed by drivers’ using cellular phones.
Legislative proposals in New Jersey and Singapore may have been inspired by fatal accidents in
those regions, which the media attributed to driver negligence while using a cellular phone.
Although the older foreign laws were imposed before any serious scientific investigations of the
problem were conducted, recent legislation often cites the Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997)
study—discussed below—as a justification for preventive action.
17
3. The Link Between Cellular Phone Use and Vehicle Accidents
There have been over twenty studies that examine the relationship between cellular phone
use and vehicle accidents.
18 Here, we review a small number that have been influential in the
policy debate over cellular phone regulation in vehicles, and that are especially useful for the
benefit-cost analysis presented in the next section.
The actual evidence implicating cellular phone use as a factor in vehicle accidents is
meager. Prior to 1997, only Oklahoma, Minnesota, North Carolina and Japan systematically
collected data on whether cellular phones were in use at the time of an accident.
19 Researchers
have reached few definitive conclusions about the existence and magnitude of the adverse
driving consequences arising from cellular phone use. The limited evidence suggests that cellular
phones contribute to less than two-tenths of one percent of vehicle accidents, or less than 100
fatalities out of 41,000 each year in the United States.
20
Studies examining cellular phone use and vehicle accidents fall into two broad
categories—epidemiological and experimental. Epidemiological studies try to establish
associations between driver cellular phone usage and collision risk. Experimental studies attempt
to measure the extent to which cellular phones distract a driver by testing behavioral responses in
                                               
17 Redelmeier was inspired by anecdotal evidence to study the safety of cellular phone use in vehicles. See Kolata
(1997).
18 For a good overview of the scientific literature, see NHTSA (1997).
19 See NHTSA (1997). We do not have systematically collected data after 1997.
20 We also examined non-fatal injuries and property damages resulting from crashes associated with cellular phones.
In all cases where data on crashes and fatalities were available, the proportion of crashes associated with cellular
phones did not differ substantially from the proportion of fatalities associated with cellular phones. While we use
these proportions interchangeably in our analysis, it is not clear whether the proportions are actually equal.  For
example, accidents associated with cellular phone use are probably underreported relative to fatalities because
accidents involve self-reporting while fatalities are investigated more thoroughly.7
controlled settings. Based on our literature review, we believe there is a probable connection
between cellular phone use and accidents, but the size of the problem is unclear.
Epidemiological Studies
Although statisticians have gone to great lengths to limit the influence of confounding
factors in epidemiological studies, the results are frequently open to interpretation. The principal
problem with such studies is that they do not control for important variables that are difficult to
measure. For example, both increased cellular phone use and increased accidents could result
from circumstances in which traffic conditions worsen, but this variable is not measured in most
analyses. Sample selection and unmeasured driver-specific characteristics that vary with cellular
phone use can also bias research findings.
An influential study by Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) in the New England Journal of
Medicine found that cellular phone use in vehicles quadruples the risk of having an accident.
21
The authors avoided many of the pitfalls associated with driver-specific characteristics varying
with cellular phone by using each driver as his own control. Interestingly, the Redelmeier and
Tibshirani (1997) study found no statistically significant difference between the driving
impairment effects of using hand-held cellular phones and using hands-free cellular phones.
Redelmeier and Tibshirani hypothesized that paying insufficient attention to driving while
conversing on the phone is the key factor in increasing collision risk.
22
Another study employing traditional epidemiological methods found an increase in the
likelihood of accidents from using cellular phones in vehicles. Violanti and Marshall (1996)
divided cellular phone users into two groups: the first consisted of people who used their phones
more than 50 minutes per month and the second consisted of people who used their phone less
than 50 minutes per month. They then randomly selected drivers from these groups who did and
                                               
21 The authors compare this quadrupling in risk to the effect produced by driver intoxication at the legal blood
alcohol content limit. The public and legislators have often misinterpreted this finding as a statement by the
researchers that driving while talking on a cellular phone is just as dangerous as driving while drunk.
22 The Redelmeier and Tibshirani study is excellent, but needs to be applied with care. The study itself focuses on
the association between driver use of cellular phones and motor vehicle collisions with substantial property damage,
but no personal injury. There are problems with their study that could lead to an overestimate of risks associated
with cellular phone use. Perhaps the most important is that cellular phones could have been used after an accident
occurred to call for help. In addition, extrapolating cellular-phone use associated with accidents with no personal
injury to cellular-phone use associated with fatalities may be problematic. Specifically, we suspect that drivers are
likely to take more care if they are in situations where fatal accidents are more likely to occur. Because of the
uncertainty in applying Redelmeier and Tibshirani’s results to fatalities and the likely bias towards overestimating
the risks of cellular phones, we use their numbers to calculate an upper bound for our range.8
did not have accidents. They found a 5.6-fold increase in accident risk associated with talking on
a cellular phone more than 50 minutes per month while driving. The authors controlled for
demographic characteristics and 18 possible driver behaviors affecting attention such as talking
with others, drinking beverages, smoking, and adjusting seats or mirrors.
Using a different methodology, Redelmeier (1998) finds a weak negative relationship
between increases in cellular telephone use and increases in motor vehicle accidents in Toronto
over a ten-year period. Taken at face value, the relationship would imply cellular phones could
actually save lives on net. Redelmeier cautions against this conclusion because of potential
biases in the data. We interpret the fact that you cannot see the impact of cellular phones in the
aggregate accident statistics as an indicator that cellular phones play a minor role relative to
other contributing factors. The advantage of Redelmeier’s approach is that he considers the effect
of cellular telephone use on motor vehicle accidents as a whole. This approach accounts for the
substitution of cellular phone use for other potentially risky driver activities, because the
influence of other activities is captured in aggregate accident statistics.
Experimental Studies
Several researchers have tried to assess the magnitude of the distraction imposed by
talking on a cellular phone, but there is little agreement on the actual magnitude of the impact.
Three studies that simulate driving while using a cellular phone do show significant impairment
effects. Nilsson et al. (1993) recorded reduced braking reaction times and headway distance for
drivers talking on cellular phones. McKnight (1991) found that complex phone conversations
have the greatest adverse impact on driving performance. A recent Horswill and McKenna
(1999) study argues that drivers are more likely to take risks when distracted by a verbal task like
talking on a cellular phone.
23 All three results seem consistent with the Redelmeier and
Tibshirani (1997) study, which emphasized the role of driver inattention in such collisions.
In contrast, two important studies, where experimental subjects drive on roads, suggest
cellular phones have little incremental impact relative to everyday distractions. Fairclough et al.
(1991) found that cellular phone conversations and passenger conversations are not substantially
different in their effects on the driver. Parkes (1993) obtained results indicating “no evidence of
change in driving behavior during phone conversations.”
24 In a driving simulator study
                                               
23 Horswill and McKenna (1999).
24 Parkes (1993, p. 219).9
performed by the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, Green and Williams
(1993) ranked reading a map and changing a cassette tape as more distracting tasks than talking
on a phone.
25
The bias in driver simulation studies is difficult to estimate.  Driving simulator studies
could overstate the risk from cellular phones if lab subjects have fewer incentives to drive safely
than do people in the real world. Simulator studies could overstate or understate risk if they
examine the effects of cognitive tasks that impose an unrealistically low or high burden on the
driver. For example, real cellular phone conversations may be more or less distracting than
laboratory conversations.
4. Benefit-Cost Analysis
While a few jurisdictions are beginning to collect information on the relationship between
cellular phone use in vehicles and accidents, there has been little economic analysis done on this
issue. One important exception is a study by Redelmeier and Weinstein (1999).  Using demand
data from Canada and relying primarily on the study by Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) to
estimate the relative risk of driving while using cellular phones, Redelmeier and Weinstein argue
that a ban is not likely to be a cost-effective measure. Our quantitative analysis differs from that
study in three important respects–first we rely on actual data from the United States on accidents
related to cellular phone use to develop our best estimate of the costs of a ban because we believe
such data are likely to be more reliable; second, we use a comprehensive U.S.-based econometric
study by Hausman (1997) to derive an estimate of the demand for using cellular phones while
driving; and third, we assume that the marginal cost of supplying cellular phone services is
positive.
26
We begin by examining the benefits and costs of a ban in the United States.
27 This
calculation is then used to provide a rough estimate of the net costs of an actual ban in Victoria,
Australia.
28 Our basic finding is that the economic costs of a ban on cellular phone use in
                                               
25 The study’s results echo widespread sentiment among cellular phone users that legislation banning cellular phones
in vehicles is comparable to a warning from the government cautioning “Don’t think and drive”(Cohen, 1997).
26 In contrast, Redelmeier and Weinstein assume that the costs of supplying cellular phone services are zero in their
calculation of net benefits. They also estimate a demand curve using eight observations of price and quantity in
different years without controlling for any other variables. Their estimation approach does not sort out shifts in
demand and supply, thus calling into question their measure of net benefits.
27 The ban we consider would still allow cellular phone users to make “emergency calls” from their vehicles.
28 Net costs equal costs minus benefits.10
vehicles far outweigh the benefits. Therefore, we argue against a ban. The reason is simple—
cellular phone use in vehicles provides substantial benefits to users, while at present, cellular
phones used in vehicles do not appear to contribute to a large number of accidents. Our second
set of calculations addresses a more difficult issue—whether particular regulations mandating
cellular phone innovations would represent a relatively low cost way of reducing accidents. As
an example, we consider the case of mandating a hands-free device that is similar to a phone
headset used in office environments.  While the results are not as clear-cut as a ban, they suggest
that such regulation is probably not warranted on benefit-cost grounds. Next, we develop a
calculation that shows a break-even incremental cost for cellular phones, which could be useful
to regulators who are thinking about necessary conditions for intervening in this technologically
dynamic market. Finally, we review some important limitations of the benefit-cost analysis and
highlight key insights.
Costs of a Ban
The benefit-cost analysis of a ban requires estimating the cost to cellular phone users, the
cost to producers, and the monetized benefits associated with a reduction in accidents. For
simplicity, the cost of a ban to producers is assumed to be zero.
29 Thus, quantifying and
monetizing the costs of a ban to cellular phone users can be done by estimating the net loss in
consumer surplus.
30 Industry-wide demand functions for cellular phone service allow economists
to approximate the economic loss to consumers from a general ban by using a measure called the
compensating variation. This measure represents the amount of money that would be necessary
to compensate cellular phone users so that they would be indifferent to a ban.
Our analysis begins with an estimate of industry-wide demand for cellular phone services
and then uses this measure to approximate the loss to consumers from a ban on using cellular
phones in vehicles. Applying sophisticated econometric techniques to confidential cross-
sectional price and subscribership data from cellular companies, Hausman (1997) provides the
most current and detailed estimates of the demand function for cellular phone use.
31 He finds that
                                               
29 That is, we assume the supply curve is flat over the relevant region. This result would follow if cellular phone
services were produced at constant marginal cost. Our methodology is consistent with Hausman (1997).
30 Some drivers may object to other drivers who use cellular phones for reasons not considered here, such as envy or
moral disapproval. We do not consider these factors; nor do we consider the disdain cellular phone drivers could
have for others who may not like their activities.
31 Hausman specifies a constant elasticity demand curve for cellular phone use. He measures how subscribership
varies with a number of attributes including population, income, price of cellular service and price of substitute11
the price elasticity of cellular phone demand is -0.51, meaning that a 10% reduction in cellular
service pricing would increase demand by 5.1%.
32 Hausman imposes a lower bound on his
compensating variation figures using a linear demand curve tangent to the estimated demand
curve. Because cellular subscribership has increased five-fold since the beginning of 1994 to
over 77 million people, Hausman’s 1994 numbers substantially understate the current value of
cellular service. Consumers in the United States would need to receive at least $27 billion a year
to be indifferent to a ban based on Hausman’s calculations that employ 1994 data.
33 Using a
linear approximation, we find that the annual compensating variation would now exceed $41
billion, employing 1999 price and subscribership figures.
34
The proportion of total cellular phone revenues arising from calls occurring in vehicles
multiplied by this compensating variation yields an estimate of the cost to consumers of
prohibiting cellular phone use in vehicles.
35 Using an industry marketing survey, we estimate
consumers spend 60% of their cellular phone time while driving.
36 This estimate would imply an
annual compensating variation of about $25 billion for using cellular phones while driving.
Benefits of a Ban
Economists can measure the costs of cellular phone use in vehicles in terms of the lives,
property damage and injury costs of accidents associated with driver use. Collisions are caused
                                                                                                                                                      
services. An alternative measure, which would have been more useful for our purposes, is how actual demand,
measured in quantity per unit time, varies. Hausman suggested that that using minutes would not substantially affect
the results on elasticity (Hausman, 1999).
32 Hausman’s estimate of income elasticity is not significantly different from zero, so we ignore this component of
demand in our calculations of consumer surplus. Income effects along the demand curve do not materially alter our
consumer surplus results because cellular phones comprise a very small fraction of the typical consumer’s budget.
We recalculated the price elasticity of demand using limited 1999 proprietary data from Bell Atlantic Mobile to
account for any structural changes in the industry or consumer preference changes that might have occurred in the 6
years since Hausman’s 1993 data. We got results consistent with Hausman’s estimate.
33 Hausman later refines this lower bound to $35 billion, based on a more reasonable “virtual price.” The virtual
price is the lowest price at which no consumer would purchase cellular service. We do not adopt this algorithm in
our linear approximation. The virtual price from our approximation is about 25% higher than Hausman’s. This could
result from an outward shift in demand since 1994, owing to increases in cellular phone functionality and consumer
taste changes.
34 This linear approximation probably understates the actual compensating variation. This particular measure yields
the minimum value for any linear approximation tangent to the demand curve for all quantities between zero and the
quantity demanded in 1999. See appendix for details.
35 This calculation implicitly assumes users of cellular phones in vehicles follow the same representative consumer
model that Hausman used to describe total cellular phone user demand. This is a crude estimation based on the
assumption that demand for the entire industry accurately describes demand for that subset of industry demand
occurring in vehicles. We discuss the implications of modifying this assumption below.12
by several contributing factors so it is difficult to attribute all the costs to a single factor, such as
the use of a cellular phone. In our estimates of costs, we assume all accidents and fatalities
associated with cellular phone use are caused by cellular phones. This conservative assumption
will bias our estimates in favor of a ban.
The best estimate of accidents and fatalities is based on the available data from actual
accident reports and narratives at the state and national level. We chose to construct our best
estimate from actual data because we felt they were likely to yield a more reliable measure of the
impact of cellular phones on vehicle accidents and safety. Our upper bound is generated by using
an estimate of risk of driving from the epidemiological study by Redelmeier and Tibshirani.
Our analysis draws heavily on a study by NHTSA, which monetizes the economic costs
of motor vehicle accidents. It finds that traffic accidents result in annual losses of about $170
billion.
37 This total represents the present value of lifetime economic costs for 41,000 fatalities,
5.2 million non-fatal injuries, 3.7 million uninjured occupants and 27 million damaged vehicles.
These accidents include both police-reported and unreported accidents. Most of the $170 billion
in NHTSA’s calculation stems from lost productivity in the workplace and direct medical
expenses.
NHTSA’s measures of costs only take account of direct costs, but do not consider what
an individual would be willing to pay to reduce mortality and morbidity risks.
38 Assuming a
statistical life is valued at $6.6 million, NHTSA’s estimate would increase from $170 billion to
$410 billion.
39 Taking willingness-to-pay measures of injury costs into account, NHTSA’s
estimate increases to $630 billion.
40 This is our best estimate of the total annual cost of motor
vehicle accidents.
                                                                                                                                                      
36 We use the Yankee Group (1999) survey, which asks cellular users what percentage of their cellular minutes are
used while in transportation, adjusting for high and low volume users. This estimate assumes virtually all calls while
in transport represent calls while driving. We use a range of 40% to 70%. See appendix for details.
37 NHTSA (1994). By chance, the total numbers of crashes and fatalities in 1994 were almost exactly the same as
projections for 1999 (NHTSA, 1999). Thus, the 1994 data offer a reasonable approximation of economic costs of
accidents in 1999.
38 For example, NHTSA’s measures of lost productivity, medical and funeral costs yield an estimate of about
$830,000 per life in 1994.
39 See Viscusi (1993) for an in-depth discussion of the valuation of a statistical life. We use his value of $5 million
and adjust for inflation. Adjusting for the younger age of crash victims would increase this value of a statistical life
by less than 5%. Many regulatory impact analyses published in the Federal Register use a value of $5 million per
life.
40 The willingness-to-pay studies provide numbers for the value of a statistical life and injury, which depend on the
nature of insurance coverage for fatalities and injuries on the job. We implicitly assume that the level of insurance13
Estimating that cellular phone use contributes to just under 0.2% of total accidents,
41 we
calculate the costs of cellular phone use in vehicles to be $1.2 billion per year. About one half of
this $1.2 billion is attributable to the 78 estimated fatalities associated with driver use of cellular
phones while the other half represents the costs associated with more minor accidents in which
cellular phones were a contributing factor.
42
Net Benefits of a Ban
Based on the preceding cost and benefit estimates, national legislation banning cellular
phone use in vehicles would impose annual net costs of about $23 billion.  Indeed, the costs of a
ban are over twenty times greater than the benefits. These results are summarized in the first part
of table 3 as our best estimate.
We can also estimate the costs of a ban on cellular phones while driving in other
countries. Unfortunately, data specifying demand were unavailable, but we do have data for
cellular service penetration in areas that impose bans. As an illustrative calculation, we consider
Victoria, Australia—one place where drivers are not allowed to use cellular phones. Applying
the same parameter values used in the United States,
 but adjusting for different levels of cellular
phone use, we find the net cost of the ban on cellular phones is about $400 million per year in
Victoria.
43
 There is a great deal of uncertainty in many of the parameter values used in our model.
By varying each parameter independently, we are able to determine the most important
uncertainties. We explored a number of key sensitivities, including changes in the number of
lives saved, the amount of time drivers use a cellular phone and the price elasticity of demand.
44
                                                                                                                                                      
coverage for fatalities and injuries while on-the-job is the same as the level of coverage for fatalities and injuries on
the road. See appendix for details on willingness-to-pay estimates.
41 We estimate this proportion in several ways, all of which yield between 0.0% and 0.3%. See appendix for a
discussion of our methodology.
42 Data from state accident reports were used to assess the social damage from traffic accidents in which cellular
phones were cited as a contributing factor. The data yield four different estimates of the accidents and fatalities
associated with cellular phones. These estimates are used to develop a best estimate along with an upper and lower
bound estimate, which are then used to compute our benefit-cost estimates. See appendix for details.
43 To put this number in perspective, the loss is equivalent to taking $90 from each person in Victoria or $300 from
each cellular phone user.
44 In order to account for key uncertainties, we considered a wide range of parameter values. A range of 10 to 1000
was used for lives saved, based on a lower bound from NHTSA’s study of North Carolina crash narratives and an
upper bound from an extrapolation from Redelmeier and Tibshirani’s (1997) estimate of relative risk. A more
probable range, obtained completely from actual crash data, is 10 to 130. See appendix for details. Hausman’s
estimate for price elasticity applies to all cellular phones, not only phones in vehicles. To account for this additional
source of uncertainty, we use a range of -.17 to -.84 for price elasticity, based on two of Hausman’s standard error14
The qualitative nature of our ranges does not allow us to provide precise confidence intervals. To
present this uncertainty, we first calculate the minimum and maximum costs, benefits and net
benefits by choosing the most extreme values for all parameters simultaneously. The results are
presented in the last column of table 3. For example, the benefits of a ban range from $110
million to $21 billion, primarily reflecting the large uncertainty in the number of fatalities
associated with cellular phone use. This approach creates the largest plausible ranges although it
is unlikely for the costs, benefits or net benefits to be near the ends of these ranges because such
a result would require unlikely values for all our estimates simultaneously. For this reason, the
ranges presented in table 3 overstate the uncertainty in our results.
Another approach to illustrating the sensitivity of the results is illustrated in Figure 1,
which shows the impact of varying one key parameter at a time. We use a plausible range for
each key variable and calculate the corresponding range of net benefits. Varying the price
elasticity of demand yields net cost estimates ranging from $14 billion to $73 billion. Varying
fatality and injury estimates also generates a large range for net costs, but even if cellular phones
cause 1000 fatalities a year, a ban would result in net costs of $9 billion annually. Only when
extremely conservative estimates are used for both the number of fatalities and the price
elasticity of demand do we calculate positive net benefits. Because this result requires extreme
assumptions for two variables simultaneously, we feel it is extremely unlikely the benefits of a
ban would exceed the costs. We found that for most plausible ranges in parameter values, a ban
on cellular phones vehicles cannot be justified for the United States on narrow grounds of
economic efficiency.
Hands-Free Mandate
Less draconian policies could still be justified, however. For example, a policy that
mandates the use of a hands-free device, in conjunction with a conventional cellular phone,
would allow consumers to reap many of the benefits of using phones in vehicles, albeit at some
additional cost. At the same time, such a mandate could reduce the number of accidents by
freeing a driver’s hands.
                                                                                                                                                      
estimates (Hausman, 1997). A range of 40% to 70% was used for the percentage of time cellular phones are used in
vehicles. The lower-bound estimate assumes passengers use cellular phones proportionally to drivers while our best
estimate assumes passengers rarely use phones. See appendix for details.15
We analyze the economics of such a mandate, assuming that cellular phone users in
vehicles would purchase the least expensive hands-free technology. We define the least
expensive device as the one that provides the lowest net cost to consumers after they have
already taken the convenience and private safety benefits of the device into account. The
cheapest hands-free device, ignoring convenience benefits, costs $20 and consists of a combined
earphone and microphone apparatus, which can be plugged into a cellular phone.
45 Assuming
consumers do not incur losses of convenience when they buy this cheap hands-free device, we
can place an upper bound on the net cost to consumers from purchasing a hands-free device at
$20, regardless of the price of the hands-free device actually purchased.
46 We believe that the
device consumers ultimately choose will provide some offsetting benefits and consider a range
of net costs to a consumer of $5 to $10 annually.
A hands-free mandate would force people who currently own a phone to make an extra
trip to purchase the hands-free device. After a hands-free mandate is in place, people would
presumably purchase the hands-free device concurrently with their new phone purchase and
thereby save time.
47 In this example, we include the additional search costs. We assume the
opportunity cost of time for cellular phone users is $20 per hour.
48 Each person who uses a hand-
held phone in a vehicle is assumed to spend 30 minutes shopping for a hands-free device. The
average time cost for a cellular phone user obtaining a hands-free device is equal to $10. Adding
time costs to the net costs of a purchase yields a cost to cellular phone users of about $20 for
purchase of a hands-free device.
49 If the hands-free devices last 3 years, this cost should be
amortized to get an annual cost of $7 per subscriber purchasing these devices.
50
                                               
45 Using the Internet and shopping locally, we found hands-free devices and car kits with costs ranging from $20 to
almost $400. Higher priced models include volume controls, speaker features, better sound quality, and improved
convenience.
46 As a worst-case scenario, we assume consumer willingness to pay for hands-free technology is $0 without
regulation. It is possible, however, that some consumers would get negative utility from being required to use this
device.
47 Note that new cellular phone users would probably not incur this cost because they could buy the phone and the
hands-free device at the same time.  Indeed, we expect that producers might offer packages that consumers could
buy to reduce search costs.
48 See Federal Aviation Administration (1998) for an estimate of the opportunity cost of time.
49 Because most new users do not purchase hands-free devices, we assume most users do not value hands-free
devices above the purchase price. Thus, search costs should be added to the net costs described in the preceding
paragraph.
50 Hausman (1997) uses an observed churn rate of 0.33 a year, implying a three-year amortization period. We
assume the useful life of a hands-free device coincides with the useful life of a cellular phone.16
Based on the demand curve, we predict that virtually all consumers who use phones in
vehicles will find it worthwhile to purchase the hands-free technology—i.e., the positive benefits
consumers receive from cellular service in vehicles will exceed the net costs they incur from
purchasing the hands-free device. It is assumed that a mandate of hands-free devices will not
affect the 23% of the 77 million cellular phone users who do not operate hand-held phones in
vehicles.
51
Multiplying the 60 million affected cellular phone users by the net cost of about $7 per
user yields a cost of $410 million for the mandate. Using our best estimates for all variables,
hands-free regulation would fail a benefit-cost test unless it results in a 30% reduction in
accidents related to cellular phone use.
According to evidence from accident data in Japan and North Carolina, where nearly all
cellular phones are hand-held, only about 15% of cellular-related collisions could have been
avoided if the drivers had been using hands-free devices.
52 A 30% reduction in accidents from
hands-free regulation seems unlikely given our baseline, so proposals to ban hand-held phones
flunk our benefit-cost test unless consumers receive larger convenience and safety benefits from
hands-free devices than we assume.
53 The conclusion is dependent on the number of fatalities
attributable to cellular phones. If evidence reveals that cellular phones cause significantly more
fatalities than our best estimate of 78, a hands-free mandate would pass our benefit-cost test.
The second part of table 3 presents best estimates and ranges for the benefits and costs of
a hands-free mandate in the United States. The benefit of this mandate is equal to the benefit of a
ban times the percent accident reduction. Our best estimate is that hands-free mandate would
cost users $7 per year, which implies a total cost of $410 million annually. Because of the large
uncertainty in the number of fatalities and injuries reduced by a hands-free mandate, the range of
net benefits is very large.
Because it is difficult to regulate a dynamically evolving industry such as wireless
communications, regulation should only be considered when the benefits clearly justify the costs.
While it is possible future information will reveal that a hands-free mandate is cost-effective, we
would be reluctant to recommend a mandate at this point because the data on the effectiveness of
                                               
51 Authors’ calculations using data from NHTSA (1997). See appendix for details.
52 See appendix for details on how we derive this number.
53 Some hands-free devices have a wire and earpiece. It is possible that these devices could distract drivers and
increase the risk of fatalities.17
these devices are very uncertain. Instead, we would recommend additional studies to determine
the efficacy of hands-free devices in the countries and municipalities that have required or will
require their use.
Given the limited data, we have been able to evaluate quantitatively only two options for
regulating cellular phones while driving—a ban and a mandate of hands-free devices. Because
the cellular phone industry is so dynamic, a framework for analyzing future technological
developments could assist regulators in making informed decisions. Figure 2 provides such a
framework. It presents a graph of the trade-off between accident reduction and the cost of
regulation to cellular phone subscribers based on our model.
54 The positive slope of the line
illustrates that as a device or option increases in cost, it needs to be more effective in reducing
risks for it to pass a benefit-cost test or a cost-effectiveness test.
55 A proposal lying above the line
in the graph is not cost effective in the sense that it fails to reduce accidents sufficiently to justify
its expense. For the case of mandating hands-free devices, analyzed above, the figure shows that
the area corresponding to the plausible range of accident reduction and cost per subscriber falls
almost entirely outside the cost-effective region.
56 This suggests that a hands-free mandate is not
likely to be economically justified.
To illustrate the power of this framework, consider the following example. Assume built-
in voice-activated technology on cellular phones prevents half of all accidents related to cellular
phone use and consumers derive no utility from the technology. Reading up from 50% on figure
2, regulation mandating voice technology would pass a benefit-cost test if the technology costs
no more than about $7 per subscriber annually.
The framework underlying figure 2 can also accommodate changes in a variety of key
assumptions. For example, a critical concern is how accidents could be affected by increases in
cellular phone use in vehicles. Some would argue that risks will increase more than
                                               
54 We define the area by using the number of deaths and injuries avoided by the policy option, the value for a
statistical life, the values for injuries, the direct cost to users net of utility gains and the time cost to users. Along the
border of the region, policies have net benefits of zero—i.e., consumer compliance costs just balance the benefits
from accidents avoided. In the figure, we vary the amount of accident reduction from the mandate and the net cost
per subscriber of the mandate. The economic cost of all cellular phone accidents, the monetized value of lives and
injuries and the discount rate are held constant at their respective best estimates.
55 Costs and benefits could be interpreted broadly or narrowly, depending on the information available. See Lave
(1981).
56 The complete ban on cellular phone use while driving would lie outside of this graph, in the region that is not
cost-effective. The costs would exceed $300 per subscriber, with a range of $140 of $1130. The benefits would be
less than $16 per subscriber, with a range of $1.40 to $270.18
proportionally if the number of drivers using cellular phones increases. Current data do not
support this view, however. Predictions of fatalities from driver cellular phone use based on
linear extrapolations from previous years overestimate today’s observed fatalities. The important
point for analysis is that both views can easily be accommodated in figure 2 by simply adjusting
the slope of the line to reflect particular cases of interest.
We emphasize that this framework provides a useful tool for examining different policy
options. We do not think it is definitive because there are many uncertainties and biases not
addressed in our analysis, and because other factors, such as equity, may be important in the
design of policy.
57
Other Key Factors Not Included in the Formal Analysis
It is important to consider key factors not included in the quantitative analysis that could
significantly alter the policy conclusions. The preceding analysis leaves out at least three
important factors that could bias the results: one related to estimating the costs to users of
cellular phones in vehicles; a second related to estimating the number of accidents due to cellular
phone use; and a third related to the enforcement of various policies. In short, we believe that our
methodology probably overestimated the costs of a regulatory intervention on cellular phone
users and overestimates the number of accidents reduced by intervention, given perfect
enforcement. Less than perfect enforcement will tend to reduce the costs to cellular phone users
of a regulatory intervention, but is also likely to reduce the effectiveness of the intervention.
Without knowing more about these three factors, it is difficult to predict how they will jointly
affect the net benefits from different policy interventions. At the same time, we think they are
unlikely to change the qualitative conclusions we have reached in the preceding analysis. We
consider each of these factors in turn.
The demand curve used in our analysis relates to the cellular service industry as a whole.
It does not explicitly consider the ease with which consumers can switch between using cellular
phones in vehicles and cellular phones in other places, such as at the office or on the street. Our
demand curve considers only the ease of switching cellular phone calls with other types of
communication methods like pager calls and traditional landline calls.
58 This demand curve is
                                               
57 Equity preferences also fit neatly into the framework defined by figure 2. If society values accident reductions to
citizens at large, including drivers who use cellular phones, at a premium relative to its valuation of the consumer
surplus drivers using cellular phones receive, then the slope of the line in figure 2 would decrease.
58 Landline calls refer to those calls made from traditional telephones, not cellular phones.19
not valid if replacing in-vehicle calls from cellular phones with out-of-vehicle cellular phone
calls is easier for consumers than replacing in-vehicle calls from cellular phones with landline
calls. In this case, our estimate of the cost of a policy intervention limiting cellular phone use in
vehicles is likely to be overstated. That is, the demand curve for cellular phones in vehicles
would be more elastic than the one Hausman estimates for the entire industry.
It is unlikely, however that the price elasticity will be sufficiently high to change our
ultimate conclusions with respect to a ban. For a ban to pass a benefit-cost test, the absolute
value of the price elasticity required is at least 10. Thus, if a 10% reduction in cellular calls made
in vehicles results from a 1% increase in the price of calls from vehicles, then a ban might
increase economic welfare. Because many business people place a high value on their time, calls
made while commuting to work are unlikely to be dramatically affected by a 1% increase in this
price.
The bias is also not very likely to affect the qualitative conclusion on net benefits for a
hands-free technology mandate. The decision to implement hands-free technology is insensitive
to elasticity changes unless a substantial number of consumers would choose to forego vehicle
calls altogether when confronted with hands-free regulation, a situation we consider unlikely.
59
A second potential source of bias in our results lies in the driver response to hands-free
regulation or an outright ban. The analysis implicitly assumes that the driver will not engage in
other risky driving behaviors as a result of this policy intervention. If drivers instead respond to
regulation by performing other distracting tasks in place of using the phone, the gross accident
figures from NHTSA data systematically overstate the extent to which a ban would help.
60 In
fact, we do not know whether a driver would be likely to engage in more or less risky behavior.
It is highly unlikely, however, that this intervention would result in changes in driving behavior
that are riskless.
In an extreme scenario, one could imagine a driver performing a task more distracting
than talking on a phone under a ban. More than half of all cellular phone users have used their
                                               
59 Consumers will choose the utility-maximizing alternative. Either they will buy the hands-free device or they will
stop making vehicle calls. Even with a price elasticity of over 5 in absolute value with respect to vehicle calls,
mandating hands-free devices would reduce the number of drivers making vehicle calls by less than 10%. See
appendix for details.
60 The argument is similar to the one made by Peltzman (1975) in his seminal article on automobile safety
regulations. Peltzman shows that drivers will actually increase other risk-taking behaviors in response to safety
regulations, such as a seat-belt mandate. Since Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) compare the risk of driving with a
cellular phone with the risk of driving without a cellular phone, they cleverly account for other risky behavior.20
phones to call for directions according to a 1995 Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association survey.
61 Drivers who value their time may need directions to a destination. With
access to phones, they may elect to call from their vehicle for directions. Without access to
phones, they may attempt to read a map while they are driving. According to the Transportation
Research Institute, reading a map is actually more distracting than talking on a phone.
62 In this
example, a ban would increase the risk a driver imposes on others.
While we are not arguing that overall risks would increase, we are arguing that the gross
number of accidents and fatalities associated with cellular phones are likely to overstate the
actual risk reduced from the policy intervention, and perhaps by a large amount.
63 Drivers,
especially those who are as time-conscious as the drivers using cellular phones in vehicles, will
increase the amount of time they spend on other distracting tasks if they are not permitted to use
their cellular phones in vehicles. With a ban on cellular phone activity, we would not be
surprised to see additional fatalities from such tasks as eating, tuning a radio, or talking to a
passenger. Indeed, NHTSA estimates that fatalities associated with accidents from such
inattentive driving activities number 4,000 annually, compared with a best estimate of 78
resulting from cellular phones.
64
Another important factor that could lead to overestimation of net fatalities is the impact a
ban would have on reporting potential problems to authorities. Although most of the proposed
regulations would exempt cellular phone use in an emergency, a ban on non-emergency use
would tend to decrease the instances of people carrying phones in their cars. The safety-
enhancing effect of ubiquitous cellular phones is a byproduct of having the phones available for
other uses.  Thus, some of the positive social impacts of cellular phones would be reduced.
65
The impact of overestimating accidents and fatalities on our results would be to make the
proposed ban and the mandate to use hands-free devices look less attractive from an economic
                                               
61 CTIA (1995).
62 Green and Williams (1993).
63 For a good overview of such risk-risk tradeoffs, see Graham and Wiener (1995). For a recent analysis of the
economics of such trade-offs, see Lutter, Morrall, and Viscusi (forthcoming).
64 NHTSA (1999).
65 Moreover, some laws could directly discourage accident reporting.  Consider, for example, a law that prohibited
having a cellular phone accessible to the driver or turned on in the car. While no studies have quantified the impact
of the increased prevalence of cellular phones, it is reasonable to believe good Samaritan cellular phone users are at
least partially responsible for the decrease in notification times (see NHTSA, 1997).21
point of view. Since they already are unlikely to pass a benefit-cost test, this is unlikely to
change our qualitative results.
A final key issue that needs to be addressed is how the policy is actually enforced. Our
calculations have assumed that policies are perfectly enforced. We know that in many countries
these policies are either not enforced or that enforcement is far from perfect. Moreover, some of
these policies may be quite costly and difficult to enforce.
66
Less than perfect enforcement is likely to reduce both the costs and the benefits of the
two policies considered here. A plausible assumption is that the costs and the benefits will be
reduced proportionally. If benefits and costs are reduced roughly proportionally when a policy is
imperfectly enforced, then the qualitative relationship between benefits and costs is not likely to
change. Unfortunately, the proportionality assumption may be simplistic. Suppose, for example,
those users who benefit most from cellular service would be the ones willing to risk getting
caught. If so, the cost of regulation would decrease dramatically if the law were poorly enforced.
The people getting the most surplus from cellular service would be the people who break the
law. But if the citizens receiving the greatest surplus from cellular phones are also the citizens
who are most likely to abide by the law, we might expect a ban to have relatively greater costs.
Without more detailed information, it is difficult to know how imperfect enforcement will affect
costs and benefits.
Another important issue related to enforcement arises if the police have a fixed amount of
resources. If some resources were devoted to enforcing driver cellular phone regulations, then
some benefits would presumably be foregone elsewhere because other policies would be
enforced with less vigilance. Without more information, it is difficult to know whether this issue
is important empirically.
Our basic conclusion is that the enforcement considerations could be important
determinants of the overall level of net benefits achieved from the policies considered here. At
the same time, they are not very likely to change the qualitative results.
                                               
66 For example, imagine trying to enforce a total ban in the United States. Drivers who use cellular phones could
respond by putting tinted glass in their vehicles, making phone use harder to detect.22
5. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions
Regulation of the use of cellular phones while individuals are driving is now
commonplace outside the United States and has been proposed in a number of jurisdictions in the
United States. This paper provides an economic framework for evaluating proposed regulations
of cellular phones in vehicles to reduce accidents and fatalities.
On benefit-cost grounds alone, we have argued that a proposed ban and a mandate to use
hands-free devices are not likely to be justified in the United States. We are less sure whether
such policies are justified elsewhere because of an absence of data.
67
We are doubtful that the net benefits from a ban on drivers’ use of hand-held phones
would be significant for three reasons. First, the results of our quantitative benefit-cost analysis
suggest that costs are likely to exceed benefits under a wide range of assumptions. Second, our
best estimates of accident and fatality reductions do not take into account how drivers would
alter their behavior in response to regulation. If regulations were enforced, drivers may simply
switch to other risky behaviors. Thus, the net reductions in accidents and fatalities are likely to
be overstated, which means that the benefits of regulatory interventions could be quite small.
Third, the technology is already moving in the direction of voice activation, which could reduce
risks.
The economic analysis of mandating driver’ use of hands-free devices is less conclusive.
Our benefit-cost analysis suggests that such devices are not likely to be justified, but there are
large uncertainties on both the benefits and costs. Without stronger data supporting the view that
such devices actually reduce accidents and fatalities, we would be reluctant to recommend
requiring their introduction.
It is likely that the market will more effectively address risks associated with cellular
phone usage than would highly regulatory government intervention. Several cellular phone
makers, such as Sprint, have introduced voice-recognition technology into their most recent
product designs. Current voice-activated technology may be inadequate for substantially
reducing the risk of driver’ dialing, answering, and talking on a cellular phone. But future
                                               
67 Our analysis does not consider the impact of targeting different groups. Strictly from an economic perspective, it
could make sense to target groups that are higher risk or that have a lower willingness to pay for calls. The empirical
data on accidents associated with cellular phones are not sufficient to determine whether any subpopulations
contribute to more collisions than their cellular use would imply. It might theoretically be possible to target groups23
improvements spurred on by the demand for individual safety and convenience may lead to
dramatic reductions in collision risk. Private demand for convenience could eliminate the
external risks to driving while talking on a cellular phone by encouraging safety-enhancing
innovation. The negative safety externalities feared by regulators will disappear if that happens.
68
If the problem with using cellular phones while driving becomes severe enough, vehicle
insurance companies may begin to classify drivers who use cellular phones in higher risk groups
and to charge these drivers commensurately higher insurance premiums.
69 Because an insurance
company bears the burden of reimbursing injured parties for their losses, a rational company
would consider charging drivers who use cellular phones higher premiums to compensate for any
increased risk that cellular phone use forces the company to assume.
70
Instead of regulating now, the government should carefully monitor the problem and
improve the information base for making regulatory decisions.
71 It is possible that fatalities are
significantly underestimated now. Moreover, an argument can be made that accidents will
increase more than linearly as more drivers use cellular phones in vehicles. Finally, technologies
could emerge that the government should encourage. To address those issues, the federal
government and the states should collect more systematic information on the possible
relationship between cellular phone use while driving and accidents. In addition, the federal
government should assess the benefits and costs of introducing promising new technologies,
such as voice activation. The government should also consider funding studies that help to
establish the extent to which cellular phones increase net accidents and fatalities, taking into
account the potential positive impacts that cellular phones could have on the reporting of hazards
and accidents.
Simple improvements in information collection could help reduce uncertainty. If all states
included a statistic in their accident reports describing whether the driver was using a cellular
                                                                                                                                                      
with a lower willingness to pay for calls simply by applying a tax on calls in vehicles. Without additional data,
however, we think such targeting is not appropriate.
68 Alternatively, if the negative externalities are large, the government may want to consider subsidizing safety-
enhancing innovation, such as voice-recognition technology, or taxing safety-reducing devices. For discussion of the
conditions under which taxes and subsidies can achieve optimality, see Baumol and Oates (1975).
69 Note, however, that each insurance company has an insufficient incentive to investigate the link between cellular
phones and accidents, fearing that its competitors will “free ride” off its research findings. Thus, in principle,
government has a role in funding basic and applied research.
70 Insurance companies are not likely to introduce such pricing schemes if the transaction costs of doing so exceed
the private benefits to the company.24
phone at the time of a collision, the resulting national data would be much more reliable. Similar
additions to the Fatality Analysis Reporting System, endorsed by NHTSA, could substantially
improve the federal database.
72
The general lesson we take from this analysis is that the mere existence of a problem does
not, by itself, warrant government intervention. Our review of the available data suggests that
drivers’ cellular phone usage does lead to an increase in accidents and fatalities. It is not obvious,
however, that feasible government policies would significantly reduce the size of the problem.
Moreover, for government intervention to be warranted, a strong case needs to be made that the
likely economic benefits exceed the costs by a significant amount.
73 Our analysis suggests that
the case has yet to be made for regulating drivers’ use of cellular phones; however, a more
tempered response, in which government continues to assess the size of the problem and improve
information, is warranted.
                                                                                                                                                      
71 Many states have indicated that they will investigate collisions involving criminal charges by reviewing the
calling records when a cellular phone was reported to be in use. See NHTSA (1997).
72 Another information-enhancing option proposed in England is the mandatory installation of a “black box” in all
vehicles that would record the sounds inside a vehicle cabin before the vehicle crashed.
73 For a similar argument regarding airplane noise regulations, see Morrison and Winston (1999).Table 1
State Laws and Proposed Legislation for Regulating Cellular Phones in Vehicles
State Legislation Proposed Legislation 
a Year b
California Safety information Ban hand-held 1987
Colorado Discourages negligent phone use 1998
Connecticut Ban hand-held 1999
Delaware Inattentive driving law 
c 1996
Georgia Ban hand-held, Discourages negligent use 1997
Florida One ear free to hear 1992
Hawaii Ban hand-held 1995
Idaho Inattentive driving law 1996
Illinois Ban hand-held 1997
Iowa Total ban
 d 1997
Louisiana Data collection 1999
Maine Ban hand-held 1999
Maryland Total ban 1999
Massachusetts One hand on wheel 1990
Minnesota Data collection 1991
Nebraska Total ban 1997
Nevada Total ban 1999
New Jersey Data collection Total ban 1996
New Mexico Inattentive driving law 1996
New York Data collection Total ban,
d Ban hand-held, Warning labels 1996
Ohio Inattentive driving law Total ban, Data collection 1997
Oklahoma Data collection 1992
Oregon Total ban, Ban urban, Ban hand-held, Data
collection
1997
Pennsylvania Ban hand-held, Inattentive driving law 1995
Rhode Island Ban hand-held 1999
Texas Total ban, Ban hand-held 1999
Utah Total ban,
e Inattentive driving law 1998
Virginia Ban hand-held, Ban phones in school buses 1995
Washington Allow headset/ear-piece 1996
Wisconsin Inattentive driving law Total ban 1995
Sources: NHTSA (1997), State Net search through Lexis and personal communication with ComCARE Alliance
(1999).
a Proposed legislation may refer to more than one piece of legislation. Bans refer to bans on hand-held cellular
phone use in moving vehicles, exempting emergency calls.
b Identifies the year in which legislation was first proposed or adopted.
c All states have inattentive driving laws. These states were judged to have strict laws in accordance with NHTSA
(1997).
d Allows a grace period of two-minute for pulling off to the side of the road.
e Utah’s ban proposal would exempt phones with voice-activated technology.Table 2
Legislation in Other Countries
Country / State Legislation First Year
Proposed
Australia Ban hand-held phones 1996
Australia / New
South Wales
Ban hand-held phones 1935
Australia /
Victoria
Ban driver use of all types of phones 1988
Brazil Ban hand-held phones Not available
Chile Ban hand-held phones Not available
England Ban hand-held phones, Strict inattentive driving law 1992
Israel Ban hand-held phones, Strict inattentive driving law 1970
Italy Ban hand-held phones, Strict inattentive driving law Not available
Portugal Ban hand-held phones Not available
Philippines Ban hand-held phones Not available
Singapore Ban hand-held phones, Ban phones in public service vehicles,
Strict inattentive driving law
Not available
Spain Allows headset or ear-piece use 1990
Switzerland Ban hand-held phones, Strict inattentive driving law 1996
Source: NHTSA (1997).Table 3
Benefits and Costs of Policies Regulating Cellular Phones in Vehicles
(in millions of dollars)
Ban the Use of Cell Phones While Driving
Best Estimate Range 
a
Benefits $1,200 $110 to $21,000
Costs $25,000 $10,000 to $87,000
Net Benefits 
b,c ($23,000) ($87,000) to $6,800 
d
Mandate Hands-Free Devices
Best Estimate Range 
a
Benefits $180 $0 to $6,300
Costs $410 $100 to $600
Net Benefits 
c ($230) ($600) to $6,200
Sources: Hausman (1997), NHTSA (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999). See text and appendix.
a Ranges are determined by taking maximum and minimum values of key parameters.
b Numbers in parentheses are negative.
c Number may not add due to rounding.
d The upper bound on benefits and the lower bound on costs cannot occur at the same time because they assume
different levels of penetration. $6,800 represents the maximum net benefits when the penetration rate in the cost
and benefit calculation is the same.Figure 1
Sensitivity Analysis for Key Variables
Sources: Hausman (1997), NHTSA (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999). See text and appendix.
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Appendix
This appendix explains the procedures used to obtain the results presented in the body of
the paper. These results include the benefits and costs of banning cellular phone use in vehicles
and mandating the use of hands-free devices.
Benefits of a Ban
We use two approaches to estimating the number of traffic accidents in which cellular
phones were a contributing factor: one based on actual data and one that extrapolates from an
epidemiological study. Data from state accident reports in which cellular phones were cited as a
contributing factor provided estimates for our lower bound and best estimate. An estimate of the
relative risk of driving while using a cellular phone was used to estimate the total number of
traffic accidents attributable to cellular phone use.
74 For reasons explained below, this estimate is
used as our upper bound.
The state accident data yield several different estimates of the number of accidents and
fatalities associated with cellular phones. The first estimate is based on detailed accident data
from Oklahoma and Minnesota, whose accident reports contain specific provisions for recording
cellular telephone use. The data, from 1994 through 1998, provided the numbers of accidents and
fatalities associated with cellular phone use and other factors.
75 We adjusted the accidents and
fatalities from each year for the increases in subscribership that occurred between that year and
1999 to generate five estimates of projected 1999 accidents and fatalities.
The first estimate of the number of traffic accidents associated with cellular phones is
obtained by averaging projected accidents and fatalities over all years for both states. A
comparison of estimates of cellular phone fatality and accident data with the statewide accident
and fatality data provides estimates of the proportion of accidents and fatalities attributable to
driver cellular phone use. Since the available data does not suggest otherwise, we assume cellular
phones are associated with accidents and fatalities in rough proportion to national totals for
accidents and fatalities. This assumption is discussed below. Rounding slightly, we assume 3 in
every 1,000 accidents and fatalities are related to cellular phone use.
A second estimate of the damage caused by cellular phones is based on North Carolina
data between 1989 and 1995, described in detail in NHTSA’s 1997 report on wireless safety.
NHTSA obtains estimates of accidents for 1999 by fitting the North Carolina data to a second-
degree polynomial and projecting the number of accidents into the future. They estimate that less
than 3 in every 10,000 accidents and fatalities will be related to driver cellular phone use in
1999. This estimate is our lower-bound estimate for the benefits of a ban.
NHTSA’s Fatal Analysis Reporting System (FARS) national summary data records all
motor vehicle fatalities from accidents. Our third and fourth estimates come from national data
from FARS for 1994-1997. All states use accident narratives in fatal accidents that attempt to
explain the underlying contributing factors in accidents. FARS summarizes the state data from
accident narratives, providing national numbers for fatal accidents in which cellular telephone
use was a “possible distraction inside the vehicle.”
76 As with the state data, we adjust the cellular
                                               
74 See Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) for an explanation and derivation of the relative risk.
75 Oklahoma Highway Safety Office (1997) and Minnesota Office of Traffic Safety (1998). In some years, data on
either crashes or fatalities were missing so we extrapolated from one to the other using proportionality constants
determined from years where both fatalities and crashes were available.
76 NHTSA (1997).A2
phone fatalities from prior years to the current year by multiplying by a subscribership growth
factor. Averaging across all years, our third estimate is that cellular phone use accounts for 3 out
of every 1,000 accidents and fatalities in the United States.
An important anomaly exists in the FARS data. Oklahoma accident reports, which
specifically record cellular phone use and installation, account for all but 82 of the 219 cellular-
related fatalities recorded over the four-year period. NHTSA asserts that the non-Oklahoma data
is probably better: “Although the information in FARS can be misleading with regard to the
proportion of cellular telephone related accidents in Oklahoma, it is believed that the cases from
other states are accurately coded.”
77 Disregarding the Oklahoma data and using the projected
fatality procedure outlined above, we obtain our fourth estimate that cellular phones are
associated with only 1 in every 1,000 vehicle accidents and fatalities.
We weigh each of the previous four estimates equally—two from state data and two from
national data. This yields our best estimate: 2 out of very 1000 accidents and fatalities are
associated with driver cellular phone use. Pro-rating these proportions to national traffic
accidents and fatalities yields our best estimate of the total number of fatalities annually in the
United States.
We calculated our upper-bound estimate of the number of fatalities by using a study by
Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) that estimated the relative risk of talking on a cellular phone
while driving. This study estimates that talking on a cellular phone increases the chances of
getting in a minor accident by a factor of 4.3, termed the relative risk. People have questioned
this result for several reasons. First, omitted variable bias would lead to an overestimate of the
relative risk if people use their cellular phones more during hazardous driving conditions or to
call ahead when they are late and probably driving fast. Second, people routinely use cellular
phones to call after getting in an accident. If the exact time of the call is uncertain, some of these
emergency calls could be misinterpreted as causing the accident.
Third and most importantly, Redelmeier and Tibshirani estimate the increased risk of
getting in a minor accident, not a more serious collision. It is not clear that this risk is equivalent
to the risk of getting in more serious accidents involving injuries and fatalities. Oklahoma and
Minnesota have the only data comprehensive enough to test the assumption that equal
proportions of minor accidents and fatalities are associated with cellular phones.
78 Two problems
emerge, making it difficult to draw any strong conclusions. First, minor accidents often involve
self-reporting while fatalities are investigated in much more detail. Drivers may not admit they
were involved in potentially risky behavior at the time of the accident unless questioned by an
officer. Second, only a few fatalities occurred in Oklahoma and Minnesota over the time period
for which we have data. This analysis leaves much uncertainty about extrapolating the results of
the Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) study to more serious accidents. Because we have no
empirical reasons to assume otherwise, we apply their relative risk of 4.3 to all types of
accidents.
Using the assumptions in table A-1 and rounding slightly, we calculate that .7% of the
driving time is spent on a cell phone. If drivers spend .7% of their time on a phone and the
relative risk is 4.3, 3% (1300) of the 41,000 fatal accidents occur while the driver is talking on a
                                               
77 NHTSA (1997, p. 51).
78 National data only record cellular phone use associated with fatalities, not minor accidents. We looked at
collisions involving only property damage and those involving fatalities. Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) only
study collisions involving property damage and no injuries. A similar approach theoretically could look at fatalities
but the data are insufficient.A3
phone. Subtracting off the general risks from traveling in a vehicle implies that 1000 accidents
are attributable to the use of a cellular phone while driving. We use this estimate as our upper
bound.
Table A-1: Variables for Calculating Fatalities Using Relative Risk
Relative risk 4.3
Cellular phone use per user per year 20 hours
Number of subscribers  77 million
Percentage of cellular minutes spent driving 60%
Total projected fatalities 41 thousand
Number of vehicle miles 3.5 trillion miles
Average speed 25 mph
Sources: Battelle (1997), CTIA (1999), Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997), NHTSA (1996),
NHTSA (1999), Yankee Group (1999).
In summary, we estimate cellular phone use in vehicles is associated with 78 fatalities,
with a range of 10 to 1000 fatalities. By assuming cellular phones contribute to injuries and
property damage in proportion to fatalities, we calculate cellular phone use in vehicles leads
12,000 accidents and $1.2 billion in damages. The range in fatalities corresponds to a range of
2,000 to 150,000 accidents and $170 million to $3.4 billion in damages.
We convert these damages to monetized costs by first calculating the total cost of
national accidents. We use this estimate to calculate the costs of the fraction of accidents
attributable to cellular phones. To derive the $630 billion for overall national accident costs, we
begin with NHTSA’s $170 billion estimate. This figure only includes direct outlays for property
damages, medical expenses, legal costs, and forgone market and household productivity for the
injured and killed victims. It does not include a person’s willingness-to-pay to avert such
catastrophic events. We adjust the NHTSA number to account for people’s willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for reducing the risks of having an injury or getting killed.
79
For our WTP estimates, we rely on WTP studies from labor markets. In order to use these
numbers, we assume workers’ and drivers’ injuries and fatalities are insured to the same extent.
Using a survey by Viscusi (1993), a value of $6.6 million is placed on a statistical life.
80 WTP
for the 41,000 lives lost in vehicle accidents is calculated at $270 billion. Following an
analogous procedure for each type of injury, total WTP for all type of injuries incurred in vehicle
accidents equals $220 billion. We substitute the $490 billion in WTP to avoid injuries and
fatalities for NHTSA’s economic costs incurred by injured or dead persons of $30 billion per
year.
81 Combining the $490 billion with the property damage and other costs of accidents of
$140 billion, we obtain our $630 billion estimate of the annual costs of motor vehicle accidents.
                                               
79 The WTP for injuries was broken down using the Approximated Injury Scale measurements endorsed by the
NHTSA (1994). This scale categorizes injuries in five groupings—minor, moderate, serious, severe, critical, fatal—
which correspond to five WTP figures calibrated to the value of a statistical life—0.0020, 0.016, 0.058, 0.19, 0.76.
We calibrated these fractions to our value of a life to obtain injury values of $13,000, $100,000, $380,000,
$1,200,000, and $5,000,000 respectively.
80 We take Viscusi’s (1993) estimate of $5 million and adjust for inflation. Adjusting for age and income growth
could increase this estimate further. For our sensitivity analysis, we use $6.6 million plus or minus $3 million.
81 WTP numbers include economic costs borne by the injured or deceased person so we substitute them for
economic costs borne by the victim.A4
The Costs of a Ban
The demand function for cellular phones in vehicles is the most crucial element in our
calculations of the cost of regulation. The most important assumptions we make are:
• Hausman’s price elasticity estimate accurately represents 1999 demand conditions at the
1999 price and quantity coordinates;
• A linear approximation to the demand curve yields compensating variation;
• Elasticity for the subset of cellular demand in vehicles is the same as the industry-wide
elasticity; and
• The proportion of cellular calls from vehicles is accurately captured in demand surveys.
The rationale for these four assumptions is provided here.
Hausman calculates his 1994 price elasticity for cellular demand from cross-sectional
data and uses a constant-elasticity functional form. The elasticity of demand in 1999 should not
be substantially different.
82 We pick the constant parameter in our constant-elasticity function to
give a demand function consistent with both Hausman’s price elasticity and our current 1999
data from CTIA.
Our linear approximation of demand passes through the observed data point for 1999.
This linear demand will lie below our constant-elasticity curve, so compensating variation will
be lower for our approximation. We prefer to take a linear approximation rather than analyze the
surplus from a constant-elasticity demand function, because the constant-elasticity surplus will
be unbounded for demand functions with elasticities greater than negative one.
83 By taking a
linear approximation to demand, we find a bounded compensating variation for all negative price
elasticity values.
Choosing another point on the constant-elasticity demand curve from which to draw our
linear approximation would change our results. We decided to take the point of tangency where
compensating variation is minimized to be conservative. Within the set of all points below the
current quantity level, this linearization gives us the lowest cost of a ban.
The price elasticity utilized in our compensating variation calculations relates to the
cellular service industry as a whole. However, we are interested in describing the response of
cellular consumers to a ban on a subset of cellular calls—those calls made while driving. We
believe a consumer’s ability to substitute a cellular call made outside the vehicle for a cellular
call made while driving exceeds a consumer’s ability to substitute landline calls or beeper/pager
communication for generic cellular calls. Hausman’s price elasticity estimate pertains to the
latter type of substitution. So we suspect the price elasticity of interest will be higher in absolute
value. It is unlikely that this price elasticity will be sufficiently high to change our ultimate
conclusions. For a ban to pass a benefit-cost test, the price elasticity required is greater than 10 in
absolute value. That is, if a 1% increase in the price of vehicular calls results in a 10% reduction
in cellular calls made in vehicles, then a ban might increase economic welfare. Because many
business people value their time extremely highly, calls made while commuting to work are
                                               
82 We test this assumption using updated data as described in the paper.
83 Specifically, with an elasticity of –0.5, one can obtain arbitrarily large compensating variations if one picks a cut-
off value for revenue sufficiently near the zero-quantity demand level.A5
unlikely to be affected by a 1% vehicle call price hike.
84 So it is unlikely that our elasticity
simplification affects our qualitative results.
Using the linearization assumption and Hausman’s elasticity, we calculate a total
compensating variation from cellular service of $41 billion. Assuming that the compensating
variation is proportional to the number of minutes cellular phones are used, we multiply the total
compensating variation by the percentage of time cellular phones are used from vehicles. As our
primary source for this percentage, we use a market demand survey of consumer habits in four
different user environments.
85 The survey allocates demand among the “home”, “office”, “car or
other transport”, and “other locations.” According to industry experts, virtually all of the use in
transport occurs while consumers are driving.
The average cellular user spends 68% of cellular phone time in a “car or other transport.”
We assume the term all “car or other transport” is entirely while the caller is driving. Because
high volume callers use cellular phones proportionally less in cars, we divide the users into high
volume users (greater than 100 minutes per month) and low volume users (less than 100 minutes
per month). By weighting their responses according to the average minutes per month, the
estimate is revised to 63%, which we round to 60% due to uncertainties in the data.
86 We obtain
a lower-bound estimate of 40% by assuming passengers use phones proportionally to drivers.
87
Industry analysts suggest the percentage could be higher than 60%.
88 A range of 40% to 70% is
used in our sensitivity analysis.
Multiplying the percentage of time cellular phones are used from vehicles (60%) by the
total compensating variation ($41,000) gives our best estimate of the cost of a ban ($25 billion).
We chose all input parameters to generate the extreme values of the costs of a ban. Most
significantly, this includes the price elasticity of demand and the percentage of time cellular
phones are used in cars. The lowest costs to a ban ($10 billion) are generated if we assume a
large price elasticity of -.84 and that only 40% cellular phone time is spent in a car. Our
upper-bound estimate of the number of fatalities (1000) assumes 60% of cellular phone time is
spent in a car. Simply subtracting the lower estimate of costs from the upper estimate of benefits
represents a logical inconsistency. This estimate relies on different values of a key parameter at
different points in the calculation. The final range of net benefits is calculated by taking
consistent values for parameters so as to maximize the overall range of net benefits. The same
interdependence does not occur for our low estimate of benefits of a ban because it is calculated
directly from accident statistics.
The Benefits of a Hands-free Mandate
The two key parameters involved in estimating the benefits of a hands-free mandate are
the amount of accident reduction such a mandate would induce and the resulting cost savings.
                                               
84 Qualitatively, the productivity-enhancing aspect of vehicular cellular phone calls renders them less price elastic.
There are few good substitutes for activities in vehicles which fulfill a time-saving role. If the time-saving value of
cellular calls made from vehicles constitutes the majority of the value consumers receive, our elasticity assumptions
seem reasonable.
85 Yankee Group (1999).
86 Cellular phone customers who use cellular phones over 100 minutes per month use 256 minutes on average while
customers who use cellular phones less than 100 minutes per month use 42 minutes on average (Yankee Group,
1999).
87 This provides a lower bound estimate for two reasons. First, we assume a driver and a passenger will not use a
phone proportionally to a single driver. Second, passengers include children who rarely use cellular phones.
88 Personal communication with Paul D’Auria from BAM (1999).A6
The two sources of data we use in calculating the extent of accident reduction are Japanese
accident data and North Carolina accident data. These data describe the activities that led to
accidents in situations where cellular phones played a role in distracting the driver. The cost of
cellular accidents derived above is used to value the accident reduction that could result from a
hands-free mandate.
The Japanese data reveal that the most common activities that led to accidents were
dialing phone numbers, answering calls, and hanging up calls. Drivers were rarely talking on the
phone when they crashed. But hands-free devices are designed to allow the driver to use both
hands for driving while the driver is actually talking on the phone. These devices are therefore
unlikely to reduce any risks encountered in initiating, receiving or terminating a call.
89 Only 16%
of cellular accidents in Japan occurred while the driver was actually talking. Even 16% probably
overstates the true reduction in accidents that would have resulted if both of the drivers’ hands
were available. Some of these accidents would have occurred even with hands-free technology
because the driver was not paying adequate attention to driving. The true percentage of accidents
avoidable with hands-free technology should lie between 0% and 16%.
90
North Carolina data show that 42% of cellular accidents occurred when the driver was
actually talking. From this data, we infer that no more than 42% of cellular accidents could have
been eliminated if all drivers had used hands-free devices. Again, because the freedom of a
driver’s hands does not guarantee the driver is paying attention, the true accident reduction from
hands-free implementation could be as low as 0%. We take the average of 42% and 16%, or
about 30%, as an upper bound on the amount of reduction in cellular accidents. Our best estimate
is that ubiquitous hands-free devices would eliminate half of the 30%, or 15%, of accidents
related to cellular phone use. We allow the accident reduction number to range between 0% and
30% in recognition of the high degree of uncertainty in our best estimate.
We monetize this accident reduction by assuming hands-free technology prevents
accident victims from incurring some of the costs of cellular accidents. Multiplying our
percentages of accident reduction (15%, with a range of 0% to 30%) by the yearly cost of
cellular accidents in the United States ($1.2 billion, with a range of $110 million to $21 billion)
gives us the benefits of regulating hands-free devices. Using the best estimates of accident
reduction and the yearly cost of accidents, we estimate that a hands-free mandate would yield
$230 million in the first year of implementation, or a discounted stream of $630 million in
benefits over the 3-year lifetime of hands-free devices.
91 For our lower and upper bounds, we use
the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the yearly cost of cellular accidents and the amount
of accident reduction hands-free mandates could induce. We obtain a range of $0 to $6.3 billion
in benefits for a hands-free mandate. Table 3 summarizes the benefits, costs and net benefits we
calculate.
                                               
89 Voice recognition might reduce these risks, though. We know of no country considering such regulation,
however.
90 One potentially adverse effect of hands-free implementation is that it might reduce driver awareness of being on
the phone. We conservatively ignore this effect even though some data suggest it might be important. This issue
should be studied further.
91 Here, we discount future benefits at 5%. Using 3% and 7% discount rates does not change our benefit estimates
much. We get $600 million with a discount rate of 7% and $650 million with a discount rate of 3%. Our range of net
estimates in table 3 is also largely insensitive to discounting.A7
The Costs of a Hands-free Mandate
The costs of a hands-free mandate consist of the cost to consumers of purchasing the
hands-free devices net of the utility or disutility of using the devices. We do not attempt to
estimate this utility loss or gain for the average user. Instead we will focus our analysis on the
cost of purchasing such devices. We also only calculate the costs to current consumers who
would be required to purchase a hands-free device separately from their phone. The costs of a
mandate would decrease if the hands-free devices where bundled with the phone purchase.
Five parameters will determine the costs to consumers: the number of consumers who
must purchase the hands-free devices; the price they pay for their devices; the utility they receive
from these devices; the wages consumers forego when they shop for the devices; and the lifetime
of hands-free devices.
NHTSA survey information assists us in determining the number of consumers affected
by a hands-free mandate.
92 Roughly 77 million Americans subscribe to cellular service, 70
million of whom use their cellular phones in their vehicles. Of these 70 million people, 11
million already have hands-free technology. Only the remaining 59 million people who drive
while calling and do not currently own a hands-free device will need to purchase one.
The price of the hands-free device we consider is only $7 annually—small in comparison
to the average of $540 people spend each year on cellular service. This represents 1.3% of the
cost of cellular service. Using the price elasticity of demand, we estimate subscribership would
fall by .7% if hands-free devices were mandatory.
93 Because this represents only 400,000 of the
59 million people who drive while talking on their cellular phones, we ignore the effect of
reduced subscribership in our analysis.
In considering the true costs to cellular subscribers who must purchase hands-free
devices, we must take their willingness-to-pay for hands-free devices into account. Presumably,
this will offset some, but not all, of the $20 price of a hands-free device. We admit we have no
idea of the value consumers place on hands-free devices, so we adopt a range of $5 to $20 net
costs per consumer, with a best estimate of $10. 
Other costs to purchasing hands-free devices include the search and shopping costs to
cellular phone users forced to purchase the devices. We estimate each user will spend about 30
minutes buying a hands-free device. Valuing this time at the average wage rate of a cellular
phone user, $20, we determine that users will incur time costs of about $10 on average.
94 Total
costs per user of hands-free technology are $20 over the three year life of the device or $7
annually, after incorporating time costs. If the net cost to each consumer is only $5 annually,
hands-free regulation will cost only $5 times 59 million, which is $300 million, to consumers
over the 3-year lifetime of the devices. If consumers do not value hands-free devices very
highly—net cost of $10 per subscriber—then hands-free regulation will cost $600 million. Table
3 shows that our best estimate of costs is the middle of the range, $410 million.
The table also presents our net benefits calculations. For our estimate, we simply subtract
our best estimate of costs from our best estimate of benefits to obtain a $230 million loss for
society. Our ranges on net benefits simply represent the maximum and minimum net benefits
that can be obtained from our ranges of costs and benefits—between negative $600 million and
                                               
92 NHTSA (1997).
93 1.3% times -.51 equals -.7%.
94 Because we do not have data that explicitly reveals the average wage rate of people who use cellular phones in
vehicles, we use data on the value of time for airline passengers instead. See Federal Aviation Administration
(1998).A8
positive $6.2 billion annually. While this range demonstrates the possibility of large net benefits,
this only occurs if our best estimate significantly underestimates the number of fatalities.